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Abstract—We propose the notion of secrecy gain as a code
design criterion for wiretap lattice codes to be used over an
additive white Gaussian noise channel. Our analysis relies on
the error probabilites of both the legitimate user and the
eavesdropper. We focus on geometrical properties of lattices,
described by their theta series, to characterize good wiretap
codes.
I. INTRODUCTION
The wiretap channel was introduced by Wyner [10] as a dis-
crete memoryless broadcast channel where the sender, Alice,
transmits confidential messages to a legal receiver Bob, in the
presence of an eavesdropper Eve. Wyner defined the perfect
secrecy capacity as the maximum amount of information that
Alice can send to Bob while insuring that Eve gets a neg-
ligeable amount of information. He also described a generic
coding strategy known as coset coding. While coset coding has
been used in many coding scenarios (for ex. [11], [8]), Wyner
used it to encode both data and random bits to confuse the
eavesdropper. A more precise coset coding technique, called
wiretap II codes, was presented in [7], where Alice enjoys a
noiseless channel while Eve has to deal with a channel with
erasures. The question of determining the secrecy capacity
of many classes of channels has been addressed extensively
recently, yielding a plethora of information theoretical results
on secrecy capacity.
There is a sharp contrast with the situation of wiretap
code designs, where very little is known. The most exploited
approach to get practical codes so far has been to use LDPC
codes (for example [9] for binary erasure and symmetric
channels, [5] for Gaussian channels). We also note that wiretap
II codes have been extended to more general settings such
as network coding in [3]. Finally, lattice codes for Gaussian
channels have been considered from an information theoretical
point of view in [4].
The problem that we address in this paper is to propose
a design criterion for constructing explicit lattice codes (of
possibly small length) to be used over additive white Gaussian
noise channels. Assuming that Eve’s channel is worse than the
one of Alice, we analyse the probability of both users to make
a correct decision, and exhibit geometrical lattice properties
that maximize Alice’s probability of making the right decision,
while minimizing Eve’s probability of decoding successfully.
These properties are captured by the theta series of the lattice
used for encoding, which in turn is used to define the notion
of secrecy gain as a measure of secrecy brough by the lattice
wiretap codes. Note that we do not consider a binary input as
proposed in [5].
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we first
describe a coset coding strategy suitable for lattices, namely
using coset lattice codes. The corresponding decoding strategy
is described in Section III. The chore results are given in
Section IV: Bob’s and Eve’s probability of decoding coset
lattice codes are computed, and we show that the behaviour
of its theta series captures what makes a lattice good for being
a wiretap code, motivating the introduction of the notion of
secrecy gain.
II. WIRETAP LATTICE ENCODING
We consider a Gaussian wiretap channel, namely a broad-
cast channel where the source (Alice) sends a signal to a
legitimate receiver (Bob), while an illegitimate eavesdropper
(Eve) can listen to the transmission. It is modeled by
y = x+ vb
z = x+ ve,
where x is the transmitted signal, vb and ve denote the
Gaussian noise at Bob, respectively Eve’s side, both with zero
mean, and respective variance σ2b and σ2e . We assume that Bob
has a good SNR, but that σ2b = N0 << N1 = σ2e , so that Eve
has a poor SNR, in particular with respect to Bob.
Alice’s encoder maps k information symbols s1, . . . , sk
from S = {0, 1} to a codeword x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn,
and over a transmission of n symbols, we get
y = x+ vb
z = x+ ve.
(1)
Alice uses lattice coding, that is the codeword x =
(x1, . . . , xn) is actually a lattice point. A lattice Λ is a discrete
set of points in Rn, which can be described in terms of its
generator matrix M by ([6], [1])
Λ = {x = uM | u ∈ Zm},
where
M =


v11 v12 . . . v1n
v21 v22 . . . v2n
. . . . . .
vm1 vm2 . . . vmn


and
v1 = (v11, v12, . . . , v1n),
v2 = (v21, v22, . . . , v2n),
. . .
vm = (vm1, vm2, . . . , vmn),
are a linearly independent set of vectors in Rn (so that m ≤ n)
which form a basis of the lattice.
Alice chooses a lattice Λb (we use the subscript b to refer
to the intended legimitate receiver Bob) and then encodes her
k bits of information into a point x ∈ Λb:
s = (s1, . . . , sk) ∈ {0, 1}k 7→ x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Λb.
In a practical scenario, a finite subset of Λb must be chosen
as a function of the available power at the receiver, though for
the analysis, we will often consider the infinite lattice, which
is simpler to understand since we do not need to take into
account the boundary effect.
In order to get confusion at the eavesdropper, we use coset
coding, as proposed in [10], [7]. The idea (which has been used
ever since, whenever there is wiretap coding) is that instead of
having a one-to-one correspondence between s ∈ {0, 1}k ↔
x ∈ Λb, the vector of information symbols is mapped to a set
of codewords, namely a coset (that is, a set of points obtained
by translation of a lattice), after which a random point to be
actually transmitted is chosen randomly inside the coset. More
precisely, we partition the lattice Λb into a union of disjoint
cosets of the form
Λe + c,
with Λe a sublattice of Λb and c an n-dimensional vector not
in Λe. We need 2k cosets to be labelled by s ∈ {0, 1}k:
Λb = ∪2
k
j=1(Λe + cj).
Since every coset contains the same number of elements, we
have that
|Λb/Λe| = 2k. (2)
Once the mapping
s 7→ Λe + cj(s)
is done, Alice randomly chooses a point x ∈ Λe + cj(s) and
sends it over the wiretap channel. This is equivalent to choose
a random vector r ∈ Λe. The transmitted lattice point x ∈ Λb
is finally of the form
x = r+ c ∈ Λe + c. (3)
We have denoted the sublattice Λe, since it encodes the random
bits that are there to increase Eve’s confusion, and is then the
lattice intended for Eve.
Example 1: Take Λb = Z2 in R2 and Λe = 2Z2, for which
we have
Z
2 = {(x, y), x, y ∈ Z}
= 2Z2 ∪ (2Z2 + (0, 1)) ∪ (2Z2 + (1, 0)) ∪ (2Z2 + (1, 1)).
The lattice Z2 is thus partionned into 2k = 4 cosets, allowing
to transmit k = 2 bits of information. Alice can then label any
of the above 4 cosets, say
00 7→ 2Z2, 01 7→ (2Z2 + (0, 1)),
10 7→ (2Z2 + (1, 0)), 11 7→ (2Z2 + (1, 1)).
To transmit the two bits 01, she then randomly picks a point
in the coset 2Z2 + (0, 1), say x = (2, 3), that is
x = r+ c = 2(1, 1) + (0, 1),
and sends this point over the wiretap channel.
By using lattice coset encoding, we notice that two lattices
play a role:
• the lattice Λb, that Alice uses to communicate reliably
with Bob,
• the lattice Λe, which is a sublattice of Λb, that appears
in the process of coset coding for encoding random bits.
Our goal is to study how the properties of these two lattices
are related to the design of good wiretap codes.
III. WIRETAP LATTICE DECODING
After transmission over the Gaussian wiretap channel, Bob
and Eve receive respectively (see (1) and (3))
y = x+ vb = r+ c+ vb
z = x+ ve = r+ c+ ve,
where we recall that r ∈ Λe encodes the random bits, and c
is the coset representative of minimum energy labelled by the
information bits. Both Bob and Eve are interested in decoding
the information bits, namely in finding the correct coset that
was sent. To do so, they need to find the closest lattice point
in Λb to their respective received signal y or z, from which
they deduce the coset to which it corresponds.
Recall that for any lattice point Pi of a lattice Λ ⊂ Rn, its
Voronoi cell is defined by
V(Pi) = {x ∈ Rn, d(x, Pi) ≤ d(x, Pj) for all j}.
Since all lattice points have the same Voronoi cell, we will
speak of the Voronoi cell of the lattice Λ and denote it by
V(Λ).
Now when transmitting a codeword xk in Rn with Voronoi
cell V(xk) over an additive white Gaussian noise channel with
noise variance σ2, the decoder makes the correct decision if
and only if the noise vector is in V(xk), an event of probability
1
(σ
√
2pi)n
∫
V(xk)
e−||u||
2/2σ2du.
In our scenario, the probability Pc of correct decision concerns
not just one point but a coset, and thus it is the probability that
the received signal lies in the union of the Voronoi regions of
Λb, translated by points of Λe. Suppose that the lattice point
xk = rk+ck ∈ Λb has been transmitted. The probability Pc of
finding the correct coset is thus, assuming no boundary effect
Pc =
1
(σ
√
2pi)n
∑
r∈Λe
∫
V(xk)+r
e−||u||
2/2σ2du.
If we take M codewords x1, . . . ,xM from Λb, then as
already noticed, all Voronoi cells are the same, namely
V(xk) = V(Λ), k = 1, . . . ,M , and thus we get
Pc =
1
(σ
√
2pi)n
∑
r∈Λe
∫
V(Λb)+r
e−||u||
2/2σ2du. (4)
IV. WIRETAP LATTICE CODE DESIGN
We now study the probability of Bob and Eve to make
a correct decoding decision, and try to maximize Bob’s
probability while minimizing the one of Eve. This leads us
to study the theta series of the lattices involved.
A. A first analysis
Considering the wiretap channel (1) where Alice transmits
lattice codewords from an n-dimensional lattice Λb, we thus
get from (4) that the probability Pc,b of Bob’s (resp. Pc,e of
Eve’s) correct decision is:
Pc,b =
1
(
√
2piσb)n
∑
r∈Λe
∫
V(Λb)+r
e−‖u‖
2/2σ2
bdu
Pc,e =
1
(
√
2piσe)n
∑
r∈Λe
∫
V(Λb)+r
e−‖u‖
2/2σ2
edu.
Since by assumption Bob has a good SNR, its received
vector y is most likely to lie in the Voronoi region around
the origin, and thus the terms corresponding to r 6= 0 in (4)
are negligeable, which yields:
Pc,b ≃ 1
(
√
2piσb)n
∫
V(Λb)
e−‖u‖
2/2σ2
bdu. (5)
This is now the familiar case of transmitting lattice points over
the Gaussian channel, for which it is known that Λb should
have a good Hermite parameter, to get a good coding gain.
We are on the contrary under a low SNR assumption for
Eve, namely σe is large, and thus a Taylor expansion at order
0 gives
e−||w+r||
2/2σ2 = e−||r||
2/2σ2 +O
(
1
σ2e
)
so that∫
V(Λb)+r
e−||u||
2/2σ2du =
∫
V(Λb)
e−||w+r||
2/2σ2dw
≃ Vol(V(Λb))e−||r||
2/2σ2 ,
where the volume V(Λb) of the lattice is
Vol(V(Λ)) =
∫
V(Λ)
dx = det(MMT )1/2.
The probability of making a correct decision for Eve is then
Pc,e ≃ 1
(
√
2piσe)n
Vol(V(Λb))
∑
r∈Λe
e−‖r‖
2/2σ2
e , (6)
from which we get that
Pc,e
Pc,b
≃
(
σb
σe
)n
Vol(V(Λb))
∑
r∈Λe e
−‖r‖2/2σ2
e∫
V(Λb) e
−‖u‖2/2σ2
bdu.
(7)
We know how to design good codes for Bob’s channel, and
have his probability of making a correct decision arbitrarily
close to 1. Our aim is thus to minimize the probability Pc,e of
Eve making a correct decision, while keeping Pc,b unchanged.
This is equivalent to minimize (7), that is to find a lattice Λb
which is as good as possible for the Gaussian channel [1], and
minimize
∑
r∈Λe e
−‖r‖2/2σ2
e
under the constraint log2 |Λb/Λe| = k.
(8)
The constraint on the cardinality of cosets (or rate) is equiva-
lent to set the fundamental volume of Λe equal to a constant.
It is natural to start by approximating the sum of exponen-
tials by its terms of higher order, namely∑
r∈Λe
e−‖r‖
2/2σ2
e ≃ 1 +
∑
r∈Λe,||r||=dmin(Λe)
e−‖r‖
2/2σ2
e
= 1 + τ(Λe)e
−dmin(Λe)2/2σ2e ,
where τ(Λe) is the kissing number of Λe which counts
the number of vectors of length dmin(Λe). Thus as a first
criterion, we should maximize dmin(Λe) while preserving the
fundamental volume of Λe, which is equivalent to require for
Λe to have a good Hermite parameter
γH(Λ) =
d2min(Λ)
det(MMT )1/n
.
after which we should minimize its kissing number. This
approximation however assumes high SNR, which typically
Eve does not have. We thus cannot be content with this
approximation, and have to obtain a more precise analysis.
B. The secrecy gain
Let us get back to the code design criterion (8) and rewrite
it in terms of the theta serie of the lattice considered.
Recall that given a lattice Λ ⊂ Rn, its theta serie ΘΛ is
defined by ([1])
ΘΛ(z) =
∑
x∈Λ
q‖x‖
2
, q = eiπz , Im(z) > 0. (9)
Exceptional lattices have theta series that can be expressed
as functions of the Jacobi theta functions ϑi(q), i = 2, 3, 4,
themselves defined by
ϑ2(q) =
+∞∑
n=−∞
q(n+
1
2 )
2
,
ϑ3(q) =
+∞∑
n=−∞
qn
2
,
ϑ4(q) =
+∞∑
n=−∞
(−1)n qn2 .
Example 2: Here are a few examples of theta series for
some exceptional lattices.
1) The cubic lattice Zn:
ΘZn(q) = ϑ3(q)
n.
2) Dn:
ΘΛ(Dn) =
1
2
(ϑ3(q)
n + ϑ4(q)
n) .
3) The Gosset lattice E8:
ΘE8(q) =
1
2
(
ϑ2(q)
8 + ϑ3(q)
8 + ϑ4(q)
8
)
.
4) The Leech lattice Λ24:
ΘΛ24(q) =
1
8
(
ϑ2(q)
8 + ϑ3(q)
8 + ϑ4(q)
8
)3
−45
16
ϑ2(q)
8ϑ3(q)
8ϑ4(q)
8.
From (8), we need to minimize
∑
r∈Λe
e−‖r‖
2/2σ2
e =
∑
r∈Λe
(
e−1/2σ
2
e
)||r||2
=
∑
r∈Λe
(
(eiπ)−1/2iπσ
2
e
)||r||2
= ΘΛe
(
z =
−1
2ipiσ2e
)
with q = eiπz and
Im
( −1
2ipiσ2e
)
= Im
(
i
2piσ2e
)
> 0.
Thus to minimize Eve’s probability of correct decision is
equivalent to minimize ΘΛe(z) in z = i/2piσ2e . To approach
this problem, let us set y = −iz and restrict to real positive
values of y. We are now interested in minimizing
ΘΛe(y) =
∑
r∈Λe
q‖r‖
2
, q = e−πy, y > 0,
in the particular value of y corresponding to z = i/2piσ2e ,
namely
y =
1
2piσ2e
.
This is actually a problem that classically arises in the study of
theta series [2]: given the lattice dimension n, find the lattice
Λ⋆ that minimizes ΘΛ(y) for a given value of y.
Note that if Λe is not chosen to be a particular lattice, we
can assume that Λe = Zn. We consequently define the secrecy
function of a given lattice Λ as the ratio of its theta series and
the theta series of Zn, in a chosen point y.
Definition 1: Let Λ be an n−dimensional lattice. The se-
crecy function of Λ is given by
ΞΛ(y) =
ΘZn(y)
ΘΛ(y)
=
ϑ3(y)
n
ΘΛ(y)
defined for y > 0.
As we want to minimize the expression of Eve’s probability
of correct decision in (8), we are interested in the maximum
value of the secrecy function. This yields the notion of secrecy
gain.
Definition 2: The secrecy gain χΛ of an n−dimensional
lattice Λ is defined by
χΛ = sup
y>0
ΞΛ(y).
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Fig. 1. Secrecy function of E8.
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Fig. 2. Secrecy function of D8.
Examples of the secrecy function for the lattices E8 and
D8 are shown in Figures 1 and 2, respectively. Both lattices
clearly have a maximum, happening in y = 1 for E8 but not
for D8 (which is conjectured to have this maximum in 14√2 ).
It is worth emphasizing that the value at which the secrecy
function gets its maximum is important for the code design,
since it tells us what is the SNR at which the wiretap lattice
code is providing most confusion to Eve. The two examples
suggest that this value depends on the chosen lattice.
Conjectures on the behaviour of the secrecy gain are cur-
rently being investigated. It is expected that an asymptotic
analysis will give a first insight, and that a finer study should
reveal how the secrecy gain is connected to the equivocation
rate.
Let us conclude by giving a small example of code con-
struction.
Example 3: Consider the case of an 8−dimensional (real)
construction. Suppose we want to transmit at a secrecy rate of
2 bits per complex symbol. We choose Λb = E8, since this
lattice has the best coding gain and the best shaping gain in
dimension 8. For Λe, we choose as sublattice of E8 the lattice
2E8, a scaled version of Λb. We then have
|E8/2E8| = 256
which gives as rate per complex symbol
R =
1
4
log2 |E8/2E8| = 2
which is the requested rate.
To construct E8 while preserving the overall shaping, we
choose a construction A [1]:
E8 = 2Z
8 + (8, 4, 4)
where (8, 4, 4) stands for the Reed-Müller code of length 8
and dimension 4. We repeat the same construction for 2E8,
namely
2E8 = 4Z
8 + 2 · (8, 4, 4).
We can now give a construction of E8 using 2E8:
E8 = 2E8 + (8, 4, 4) + 2 · C∤
where C∤ is the set of all representatives of the cosets of
(8, 4, 4) with minimum Hamming weights. This yields
E8/2E8 = (8, 4, 4) + 2 · C∤
which gives an alphabet with 256 codewords.
Then, the random bits label 2E8, which means that 4 of
these bits serve as information bits for 2 · (8, 4, 4) and the
other ones label points of 4Z8.
It has been proved [2], and this is the best result known up to
date, that some lattices, including E8, reach a local minimum
of their theta series for some constant y > 0 close to 1. Thus
using Λe = 2E8 indeed helps in optimizing the secrecy gain.
V. CURRENT AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we provided a practical wiretap coding scheme
using coset lattice codes. We exhibited geometric properties
that a lattice and its sublattice should satisfy to provide good
wiretap codes for transmission over additive white Gaussian
noise channels, in terms of the theta series of the involved
lattices. This yielded the notion of secrecy gain. Our analysis
focuses on error probabilities of both users rather than on
equivocation rate, though we expect that further work will
enlighten the connection between the two concepts.
We are currently studying different conjectures on the
behaviour of the secrecy gain, as well as the design of lattice
codes that fullfil the code design criteria. Having explicit
constructions of families of wiretap codes to compare will give
us a further understanding of what is a good wiretap lattice
code. It is also a natural work to address the achievability of
such codes with respect to the secrecy capacity of Gaussian
channels.
Finally, lattice codes have also been useful to design mod-
ulation schemes for fading channels. It is a natural general-
ization to consider a similar analysis of what makes a good
wiretap code in the context of fading channels.
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